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Cheska Tolentino*
I.

Introduction

While rideshare affords drivers flexible work opportunities to supplement their income, 1 it
falls short of providing economic security for many drivers who rely on rideshare as their primary
means of employment.2 Many drivers face poor pay, lack of legal protections, and an inability to
take collective action to improve their working conditions.3 According to an independent survey,
the median hourly wage for most respondents driving for UberX 4 was between $13 and $15.5
Another study published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reported that the median
hourly rate was $8.55,6 slightly higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25.7 A Reno, Nevada,
Uber driver claimed to have made $3.75 an hour “[a]fter gas, added monthly rideshare insurance,
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1
Carson Kohler, 6 Uber Drivers Who Make Up to an Extra $450/Week Setting Their Own Hours, THE PENNY
HOARDER (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.thepennyhoarder.com/make-money/side-gigs/how-much-you-make-drivingwith-uber/.
2
Just over half of Uber drivers participating in an independent survey reported that driving for Uber was their only
job.
JC, Ridester’s 2018 Independent Driver Earnings Survey, RIDESTER (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.ridester.com/2018-survey/#introduction.
3
Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber and Lyft Face an Existential Threat in California—And They’re Losing, THE VERGE (Sept.
2, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/9/2/20841070/uber-lyft-ab5-california-bill-drivers-labor.
4
UberX is Uber’s low-cost option. What is UberX?, ESTIMATE FARE, https://estimatefare.com/what-is-uberx/ (last
visited Oct. 7, 2019).
5
JC, supra note 2.
6
Sam Levin, Uber Drivers Often Make Below Minimum Wage, Report Finds, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/uber-lyft-driver-wages-median-report.
7
MINIMUM WAGE, DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage (last visited Oct. 7,
2019).
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wear-and-tear, constant oil changes and taxes.” 8 Some full-time drivers have resorted to sleeping
in their cars to make ends meet.9 Others are homeless.10
Drivers’ primary legal roadblock to achieving better pay is their status as independent
contractors. As independent contractors, rideshare drivers have limited ability to negotiate better
pay and working conditions with rideshare companies because they have no rights to collective
action or bargaining under labor law.11 Despite the limitations resulting from their status as
independent contractors, rideshare drivers have nonetheless engaged in self-help by informally
banding together.12 Whereas surge pricing ordinarily occurs when the demand for rideshare
exceeds supply,13 rideshare drivers artificially trigger surge pricing by simultaneously switching
off, then switching on their rideshare apps. 14 Their goal is simple: raise their pay.15
This Comment explains that even though rideshare drivers justifiably desire higher pay,
the potential legal and economic disadvantages of artificial surge pricing outweigh any short-term
financial benefits for rideshare drivers. First, artificial surge pricing arguably constitutes unlawful

8

Michael Sainato, ‘I Made $3.75 an Hour’: Lyft and Uber Drivers Push to Unionize for Better Pay, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/22/uber-lyft-ipo-drivers-unionize-low-payexpenses. Studies report different median hourly values because they use different methodologies to calculate pay
and costs. Levin, supra note 6.
9
Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, When Their Shifts End, Uber Drivers Set Up Camp in Parking Lots Across the
U.S., BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/when-their-shifts-enduber-drivers-set-up-camp-in-parking-lots-across-the-u-s.
10
Carolyn Said, He Drives 60 Hours a Week for Uber. He’s Still Homeless, SF CHRON. (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/amp/He-drives-60-hours-a-week-for-Uber-He-s-still-14457115.php.
11
Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1740
(2018). Drivers are also limited by their ability to negotiate because they are contractually bound to arbitrate disputes.
Carissa Laughlin, Arbitration Clause Issues in Sharing Economy Contracts, J. DISP. RESOL.197, 206-209 (2017). In
several cases, Uber has succeeded in enforcing arbitration against drivers. Id. But arbitration is not the focus of this
comment.
12
Minda Zetlin, Here's Why Uber and Lyft Drivers Are Artificially Creating Surge Prices, INC. (May 23, 2019),
https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/uber-lyft-drivers-artificial-surge-pricing-reagan-national-washington-arlingtondrive-united.html.
13
Utpal M. Dholakia, Everyone Hates Uber’s Surge Pricing – Here’s How to Fix It, HAR. BUS. REVI. (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/12/everyone-hates-ubers-surge-pricing-heres-how-to-fix-it.
14
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Uber Drivers Are Reportedly Colluding to Trigger 'Surge' Prices Because They Say The
Company Is Not Paying Them Enough, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 14, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-driversartificially-triggering-surge-prices-reports-abc7-2019-6.
15
Id.
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restraint of trade under antitrust law.16 The practice would probably expose drivers and rideshare
companies to legal liability.17 Second, because drivers cannot lawfully increase their pay through
surge pricing or by negotiating with rideshare companies, 18 rideshare will become a less attractive
employment option.

This will exacerbate rideshare companies’ recruitment and retention

problems.19 Finally, artificial surge pricing harms consumers by raising costs, diminishing price
predictability,20 and reducing affordable transportation options.21

Rider dissatisfaction will

negatively affect business for rideshare companies and drivers alike.
This Comment proposes that the solution to artificial surge pricing is increasing driver
compensation. Boosting driver pay would allow rideshare companies to directly address drivers’
economic needs, avoid antitrust liability, and promote quality services for consumers. Bolstering
driver compensation should involve outright ramping up earnings, providing benefits, giving
drivers the choice to work as either independent contractors or employees, or any combination of
these possibilities. This proposal would allow rideshare companies to somewhat preserve their
independent contractor business model. It would also give rideshare drivers the freedom to choose
whether they want to continue taking advantage of the flexibility of working as independent
contractors.

16

See discussion infra Section IV(B).
Id.
18
Rideshare drivers “lack individual bargaining power vis-a-vis the platform companies and face bargaining
disadvantages similar to those faced by employees in typical employment relationships.” Marina Lao, Workers in the
"Gig" Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018).
But drivers’ inability to negotiate contract provisions is not the focus of this comment.
19
Eliot Brown, Uber and Lyft Face Hurdle of Finding and Keeping Drivers, WALL STREET J. (May 12, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-and-lyft-face-tough-test-of-finding-and-keeping-drivers-11557673863.
20
Le Chen et al., Peeking Beneath the Hood of Uber, INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONF., 1, 2 (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/09/00011-97592.pdf (short-term surge
prices cannot be forecast).
21
Surge pricing incentivizes drivers to enter areas of high demand, such as near event venues. This can “help[s]
ensure that riders can get a ride when they need one.” Travis Andersen & Adam Vaccaro, Uber Used Surge Pricing
During Storm Last March, State Agency Rules. It’ll Cost Them $950,000, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/18/uber-used-surge-pricing-during-mass-storm-last-year-state-agencyrules-cost-them/VS2OBSYinxOxLd6lG6L8WK/story.html.
17
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Part II will provide a background of Uber and Lyft, which occupy most of today’s rideshare
market. It will also explain why the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concluded that
rideshare drivers are independent contractors, not employees. Part III will discuss why rideshare
drivers lack legal protections under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and antitrust law
because drivers are independent contractors under federal law. Part IV will discuss why artificial
surge pricing constitutes unlawful price-fixing under antitrust law. Finally, Part V will discuss
why increasing driver pay will discourage artificial surge pricing. It will also propose a solution
that aims to strike a balance between honoring drivers’ desire for higher pay and job flexibility
and rideshare companies’ goal of managing labor costs and making consumers happy. Part VI
will conclude the Comment.
II.

Background

The emergence of rideshare in 2010 transformed the transportation industry 22 and labor
market.23 Rideshare has revolutionized the way people commute and arrange carpools. 24 Uber,
the first rideshare company, debuted as the UberCab app in 2010. 25 Uber’s algorithms quickly and
efficiently match drivers with passengers. 26

“The original Uber concept—a private ride,

summoned by tapping an app on your smartphone—was so simple and universally appealing that
it upended the traditional cab industry practically overnight.”27 In 2012, the second rideshare

22

See generally Thor Berger et al., Drivers of Disruption? Estimating the Uber Effect, U. OF OXFORD (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/Uber_Drivers_of_Disruption.pdf.
23
See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J., 577, 580 (2016).
24
Shifting the Transportation Paradigm, RIDE AMIGOS, https://rideamigos.com/ridesharing-shifting-thetransportation-paradigm/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
25
Nathan McAlone, This Is How Uber Used to Look When It First Started Out — And How It's Changed Over Time,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-design-history-2010-2016-2016-2/.
26
Rory Cellan-Jones, Uber And Indiegogo - Tales of Disruption, BBC (June 24, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27999589.
27
Alison Griswold, Uber’s Stunning Journey to a $90 Billion IPO Changed Transportation Forever, QUARTZ (Apr.
27, 2019), https://qz.com/1592032/how-uber-got-to-its-90-billion-ipo-and-changed-transportation-forever/.
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company, Lyft, launched in San Francisco. 28 Known for its cars wearing pink moustaches, Lyft
began as a “community ride-sharing model.”29 Lyft and Uber work essentially the same: riders
request a private ride through a smartphone app. 30
Together, Uber and Lyft dominate the US rideshare market. 31 In the second quarter of
2019, Uber garnered 71% of rideshare spending, while Lyft earned 27%. 32 Through July 2019,
Uber and Lyft have made $50 billion in revenue in the US.33 Over 66 million people,34 or more
than one in three people in the US, have used rideshare apps. 35 3.9 million people drive for Uber
worldwide.36 Approximately 1.5 million people drive for Lyft in the US. 37 Many people drive for
both companies.38
Central to rideshare companies’ success is working with drivers as independent contractors
rather than employees.39 As independent contractors, rideshare drivers have the flexibility to
choose their own schedules; they, however, forego many benefits more often available through

28

Andrew Greiner et al., A History of Lyft, From Fuzzy Pink Mustaches to Global Ride Share Giant, CNN (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/03/business/lyft-history/index.html.
29
Christina Farr, Lyft Team Gets $60M More; Now It Must Prove Ride-Sharing Can Go Global, VENTUREBEAT (May
23,
2013),
https://venturebeat.com/2013/05/23/lyft-races-ahead-with-60m-in-funding-but-what-challenges-lieahead/.
30
Levi Davis, Lyft vs. Uber: What's the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/010715/key-differences-between-uber-and-lyft.asp.
31
Kathryn Gessner, Uber vs. Lyft: Who’s Tops in the Battle of U.S. Rideshare Companies, SECOND MEASURE (Aug.
21, 2019), https://secondmeasure.com/datapoints/rideshare-industry-overview/.
32
Id.
33
Ride Hailing: United States, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/outlook/368/109/ride-hailing/united-states (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019).
34
Id.
35
E. Mazareanu, Ridesharing Services in the U.S.- Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Jul 9, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/topics/4610/ridesharing-services-in-the-us/.
36
Uber has not disclosed the number of drivers in the US.
Company Info, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019). See also Melissa Berry, How Many
Uber Drivers Are There?, THE RIDESHARE GUY (June 1, 2019), https://therideshareguy.com/how-many-uber-driversare-there/ (estimating 1.5–2.5 million Uber drivers in the US).
37
Drivers Impact, LYFT, https://www.lyftimpact.com/impact/drivers (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).
38
Clarke Bowman, I'm a Driver for Uber and Lyft — Here Are 10 Things I Wish I Knew Before Starting the Job, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-drivers-job-advice-car-2019-8.
39
Alexis Keenan, Uber And Lyft Face 2 Big Threats to Their Business Model After New California Law, YAHOO FIN.
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/uber-lyft-lawsuit-contractors-employees-law-174002068.html.
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traditional employment.40 As independent contractors, rideshare drivers do not have the right
under the NLRA to organize collectively to improve their working conditions. 41 They do not
receive benefits, such as health insurance, retirement plants, paid time off, or vacation days. 42
Rideshare drivers fall outside scope of statutes prohibiting discriminatory conduct on the basis of
race, sex, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and age or the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993.43 Moreover, rideshare drivers are not entitled to unemployment compensation under
the Social Security Act of 1935, or minimum wage, maximum workweek hours, and overtime
guarantees under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.44
Recent news hints that trouble may be on the way for Uber and Lyft, possibly due in part
to driver dissatisfaction.45 In the second quarter of 2019, Uber posted more than $5 billion in
losses,46 and Lyft posted $644.2 million in losses.47 Rideshare competition has contributed to
Uber’s slower growth rate.48 Uber highlighted its labor issues as a risk to its competitiveness: “If
we are unable to attract or maintain a critical mass of Drivers, consumers … whether as a result of

40

How to Become an Uber Driver: Step-by-Step Guide, GIGWORKER (June 25, 2019), https://gigworker.com/how-tobecome-uber-driver/.
41
William B. Gould IV, Dynamex Is Dynamite, but Epic Systems Is Its Foil - Chamber of Commerce: The Sleeper in
the Trilogy, 83 MO. L. REV. 989, 993 (2018).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 995.
44
Id. at 993. The US Department of Labor, the agency responsible for enforcing the FLSA, has recently ruled that
gig economy workers (service providers working for a virtual marketplace company) are not employees within the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Letter from Keith E. Sonderling, Acting Administrator, U.S. Dept. of Labor
Wage
and
Hour
Division
to
[Redacted
Party]
(Apr.
29,
2019),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2019/2019_04_29_06_FLSA.pdf.
45
David Trainer et al., Opinion: Uber’s Own Numbers Show Why Investors Shouldn’t Believe in Its Vision,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ubers-own-numbers-show-why-investorsshouldnt-believe-in-its-vision-2019-08-19.
46
Uber Reports Second Quarter 2019 Results, UBER INV. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://investor.uber.com/newsevents/news/press-release-details/2019/Uber-Reports-Second-Quarter-2019-Results/default.aspx.
47
Kate Conger, Lyft’s Losses Continue, But Company Says They Will Abate, NY TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/technology/lyft-earnings-revenue.html?module=inline
48
Mike Isaac et al., How the Promise of a $120 Billion Uber I.P.O. Evaporated, NY TIMES (May 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/uber-ipo-price.html?module=inline.
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competition or other factors, our platform will become less appealing to platform users.” 49
Rideshare companies must proactively resolve their labor issues. Otherwise, their “ramp-up time,
driver quality, and customer loyalty” will likely suffer. 50
A.

Rideshare Drivers Are Independent Contractors Under the NLRA and SuperShuttle51
Applying the common law agency test adopted in SuperShuttle,52 the National Labor

Relations Board (NLRB) concluded that Uber drivers are independent contractors within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).53 The NLRA endorses a national policy
of encouraging workers to collectively bargain for better working conditions. 54 The NLRA grants
employees the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection . . . [and] the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . .
. .”55 The NLRA, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,56 excludes independent contractors from
the definition of “employee.”57 The NLRB, the administrative agency charged with administering

49

Uber Technologies, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), 1, 13, (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d647752ds1.htm [hereinafter Uber SEC
Registration Statement].
50
Russell Hensley, Cracks in the Ridesharing Market—And How to Fill Them, MCKINSEY Q. (July 2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/cracks-in-the-ridesharing-market-andhow-to-fill-them.
51
SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., Local 1338, 367 NLRB No. 75, 1, 1 (Jan. 25, 2019),
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582a96a9c.
52
See generally, id.
53
Advice Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Associate General Counsel, NLRB Office of the General Counsel, to
Jill Coffman, Regional Director, NLRB Region 10, 1, 1 (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-163062
[hereinafter Advice Memorandum from Sophir]. See also NLRB v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 US 132, 142 (1975)
(“[T]he General Counsel will decide the issue submitted, and his ‘final determination’ will be communicated to the
Regional Director by way of an Advice Memorandum. The memorandum will briefly summarize the facts, against
the background of which the legal or policy issue is to be decided, set forth the General Counsel's answer to the legal
or policy issue submitted together with a ‘detailed legal rationale,’ and contain ‘instructions for the final processing
of the case.”).
54
29 U.S.C. § 151.
55
29 U.S.C. § 157.
56
SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 1.
57
29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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the NLRA,58 enforces violations of employees’ rights to organize and bargain. 59 Congress invested
in the NLRB the primary power of interpretation and application of the NLRA. 60 The NLRB
determines in the first instance whether particular conduct is protected or prohibited under the
NLRA.61
The NLRB applies the common law agency test to determine whether a worker is an
employee or an independent contractor. 62 This test requires application of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 220 (1958) common-law factors. 63 The Supreme Court declared that courts
must consider all of the factors and that no single factor is dispositive.64 The NLRB and lower
courts have also considered that a worker’s entrepreneurial opportunity weighs in favor of finding
independent contractor status.65 Finally, in the for-hire vehicle industry, the NLRB has considered
two additional factors: whether the company receives compensation based on the amount of fares
drivers collect and whether the company controls the manner and means of the drivers’ work. 66
In determining that Uber drivers are independent contractors, the NLRB followed
SuperShuttle, a case involving shared-ride van franchisees. 67 SuperShuttle arose from a union’s

58

29 U.S.C. § 153.
29 U.S.C. § 160. See also Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 632 (2019).
60
Intl. Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 240 (1971), holding that states and federal courts ““must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.”
61
Id.
62
SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 1, citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
63
Id. at 1–2. All of the common law factors are: “(a) The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work. (b) Whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business. (c) The kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision. (d) The skill required in the particular occupation.
(e) Whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work. (f) The length of time for which the person is employed. (g) The method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job. (h) Whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer. (i) Whether or not the
parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant. (j) Whether the principal is or is not in business.”
Id.
64
United Ins., 390 U.S. at 258.
65
SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 2.
66
Id. at 1–2.
67
Id. at 1.
59
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attempt to represent SuperShuttle Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) franchisees. 68 SuperShuttle drivers
sign a franchise agreement that expressly characterizes them as independent business operators. 69
Drivers provide their own vehicles.70 They pay for fuel, maintenance, tolls, and access fees.71
They choose their schedules and assignments.72 Drivers alone retain the fares paid by customers.73
Although drivers exercise autonomy, SuperShuttle exerts significant influence over their
work environments.74 Drivers may not negotiate the terms of the franchise agreement. 75 They
must wear uniforms.76

Their vehicles must comply with SuperShuttle’s requirements. 77

SuperShuttle sets fares.78 Drivers must also pay SuperShuttle an initial franchise fee and weekly
fees for the right to use the SuperShuttle brand and ride reservation system. 79 Further, SuperShuttle
screens drivers’ criminal backgrounds, driving records, and drug and alcohol use. 80
Despite evidence of SuperShuttle’s control over the drivers, the NLRB concluded that
drivers are independent contractors by highlighting several key facts. 81 First, the extent of
SuperShuttle’s daily control over drivers is low because drivers have complete discretion over
when and where they work.82 Second, SuperShuttle’s method of payment allows drivers to keep
all the fares they earn.83 Third, drivers exercise control over their instrumentalities or tools of
work by owning or leasing their vehicles and paying for licenses to use SuperShuttle’s dispatch

68

Id. at 3.
Id.
70
Id.
71
SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 3.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 5.
74
Id. at 3–6.
75
Id. at 4.
76
Id. at 13.
77
SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 13.
78
Id. at 13.
79
Id. at 3.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 7.
82
Id. at 12.
83
SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 13.
69
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system.84 Fourth, drivers work without supervision.85 Finally, the franchise agreement between
SuperShuttle and its drivers clearly shows that the parties intended to create an independentcontractor relationship.86 Therefore, considering all the common law factor and the factors unique
to the taxicab industry, the NLRB ruled that the SuperShuttle shared-ride van franchisees are
independent contractors, not employees within the meaning of the NLRA. 87
In Uber Technologies, the NLRB applied the SuperShuttle common law agency test and
taxicab factors to conclude that Uber drivers are independent contractors. 88 In this case, the facts
are substantially similar to those in SuperShuttle. Uber Technologies arose from two charges
alleging that Uber unlawfully terminated drivers and interfered with a labor organization of
drivers.89

Uber drivers directly contract with Uber or became independent contractors of

businesses that contracted with Uber.90 Uber drivers do not pay to use the app.91 Uber requires
drivers to adhere to vehicle standards and wait for riders. 92 Uber sets fares.93 Riders pay Uber,
which retains a portion of the fares, then later pays the remainder to drivers. 94 Riders rate their
rides “on a scale of 1 (worst) to 5 (best).”95 Uber terminates drivers with average low ratings. 96
Like the drivers in SuperShuttle, the Uber drivers exercise significant autonomy over their
work, which supports the NLRB’s finding that they are independent contractors. 97

84

Id.
Id. at 14–15.
86
Id. at 14.
87
Id.
88
Advice Memorandum from Sophir, supra note 53, at 1.
89
Id. at 1–2.
90
Id. at 2.
91
Id. at 6.
92
Id. at 8.
93
Id. at 7.
94
Advice Memorandum from Sophir, supra note 53, at 2.
95
Id. at 3.
96
Id.
97
Harry Campbell, Uber Drivers Just Want to Be Free, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/opinion/uber-ab5-california.html.
85
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Uber’s

exercises low control over drivers because drivers could accept or reject ride requests, set their
own schedules and geographic locations, and work for competitors. 98 While Uber provides the
dispatch system through its app, commercial liability insurance, and assistance for minor ridercaused damage, drivers provide their own vehicles, fuel, and maintenance. 99 Drivers work without
supervision.100

Agreements between Uber and drivers “explicitly characterize[d]” their

relationship as independent contractors. 101 Although drivers shared fares with Uber, suggesting
an employee relationship,102 the NLRB reasoned that the absence of a flat fee like that in
SuperShuttle actually increased entrepreneurial opportunity; therefore, Uber’s fare-sharing
arrangement with drivers was a neutral factor in the NLRB’s analysis.103 Ultimately, NLRB
determined that Uber drivers had more entrepreneurial opportunity than SuperShuttle drivers 104
and concluded that Uber drivers are independent contractors. 105
B.

Why Rideshare Drivers Engage in Artificial Surge Pricing
Nearly half of Uber and Lyft drivers are dissatisfied with the companies. 106 To work as

independent contractors, drivers must pay for insurance, vehicles, tolls and other fees, licenses,
gas, and maintenance.107 Drivers must also pay income taxes and self-employment taxes.108
98

Id. at 6.
Id. at 11–12.
100
Advice Memorandum from Sophir, supra note 53, at 12. Rather than control drivers through supervision, Uber
relied on its customer-driven rating system to indirectly regulate driver behavior. Id. at 11.
101
Id. at 12.
102
Id. at 10 (“[I]n flat-fee arrangements, the company lacks motivation to control the manner and means of drivers’
work, giving drivers significant entrepreneurial opportunity because they retain all fares; whereas in commissionbased compensation, in which the company’s earnings depend upon driver production, the company has a greater
incentive to control drivers’ activities, thus giving them less entrepreneurial opportunity [suggesting an employment
relationship].”) .
103
Id. at 11.
104
Id. at 9.
105
Id. at 15.
106
Harry Campbell, Lyft & Uber Driver Survey 2019: Uber Driver Satisfaction Takes a Big Hit, THE RIDESHARE GUY
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://therideshareguy.com/uber-driver-survey/.
107
How Much Does an Uber Driver Make in 2019? [The Inside Scoop], RIDESTER (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.ridester.com/how-much-do-uber-drivers-make/.
108
The Uber Partner's Tax Guide, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/resources/tax-tips-for-drivers/ (last visited Oct.
31, 2019).
99

12

Drivers do not get health insurance or sick leave.109 Although fare rates have been increasing,
drivers are not taking home additional pay. 110 After expenses, drivers claim they earn $5 or $6 an
hour.111 Moreover, although drivers may earn more by working when surge price is in effect, they
now make less than before.112 Because of Uber’s changes to its surge pricing policy, drivers earn
fixed amounts instead of a percentage of the fare. 113 Because of low take-home pay, fewer
qualified people sign up to drive for Uber.114 Every quarter, Uber sees about a 30% rate of
attrition.115 Every two years, nearly all of the pool of working rideshare drivers turn over. 116
Drivers went on strike in seven cities across the country to call for better pay and benefits. 117 A
California driver participating in the strike earned $1,500 working less than forty hours a week
when she first started driving for Uber. 118 Then Uber slashed surge rates and bonuses.119 Because
of the changes to driver pay, she now works about eight to nine hours every day of the week. 120
She makes $150 a day.121
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To increase their pay, rideshare drivers have collectively engaged in artificial surge pricing
in cities across the United States.122 Some drivers who do not want to engage in the practice say
they nonetheless feel compelled to participate after three years of pay cuts. 123 Ordinarily, surge
pricing raises the regular price of rideshare fares when demand exceeds supply. 124 Uber uses an
algorithm that determines the price of fares based on the levels of demand and supply in a particular
area.125 The algorithm updates every five to ten minutes.126 Lyft uses a similar price-adjusting
system called “Personal Power Zones.” 127 Surge pricing incentivizes drivers to enter busy areas,
restoring balance between supply and demand.128 Uber’s former Chief Executive Travis Kalanick
explained that “during the busiest times . . . [surge pricing] maximizes the number of trips and
minimizes the number of people stranded.” 129 Common conditions triggering surge pricing
include inclement weather and special events. 130 For example, after an Ariana Grande concert at
Madison Square Garden in New York City in 2015, the uptick in demand for Uber rides triggered
surge pricing.131 Fares were multiplied by up to 1.8 times the non-surge fare. 132
In contrast, artificial surge pricing occurs when drivers simultaneously turn off the app to
create an apparent precipitous drop in demand, then turn it back on at the same time after surge
122
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(June 13, 2019), https://wjla.com/features/7-on-your-side/uber-drivers-nationwide-manipulating-fares-artificialsurges.
123
Id.
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pricing is triggered, thus raising fares.133 The practice has been reported at Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport,134 Tampa Bay in Florida,135 and New York City.136 A driver in
Tampa claimed that drivers have been engaging in artificial surge pricing “for a long, long time.” 137
Surge pricing’s volatility makes the algorithm unpopular among riders, a problem
exacerbated when the increase is manipulated by drivers and unconnected to any obvious external
trigger.138 To riders, surge pricing feels like price gouging.139 For “[t]he same service[,] [t]he
same amount of time[,] [t]he same trip, if in reverse,” surge pricing has irritated many riders
because it raises the price of rides precisely when rides are needed the most. 140 Further, surge
pricing’s opaque algorithm generates frustration.141 No one, except the rideshare companies
themselves, know exactly how surge pricing works. 142 In fact, surge pricing was so detested in
Honolulu, Hawaii, that the city passed an ordinance to ban it. 143 Supporters of the ordinance
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complained that surge pricing preys on riders, such as service members returning from sea or
intoxicated people.144
C.

Current Developments
Recently, drivers have engaged in high-profile efforts in courts and state legislatures to

amend laws around independent contractors. 145 In Dynamex/AB-5 in California, drivers have
aimed to simply reclassify rideshare drivers as employees. 146 Following California’s adoption of
AB-5, New Jersey147 and New York148 are considering similar measures.149 In Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, drivers sought to gain more power to change the
terms of their agreements with rideshare companies.150 In response, rideshare companies have
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forcefully objected to these efforts.151 Uber and Lyft claim that changes to worker classification
will negatively affect their business.152
In Dynamex, the California Supreme Court clarified that the “ABC test” is the appropriate
standard in finding whether workers are employees or independent contractors under state wage
law.153 The plaintiffs worked as Dynamex drivers providing “on-demand, same-day pickup and
delivery services.”154 Prior to 2004, Dynamex classified the drivers as employees. 155 Thereafter,
Dynamex reclassified the drivers as independent contractors to reduce expenses. 156 The drivers
sued Dynamex asserting that, because they performed essentially the same work as when they
were classified as employees, Dynamex misclassified the drivers as independent contractors. 157
Although the California Supreme Court did not directly address the question of whether the drivers
were employees or independent contractors, the court concluded that the appropriate standard was
the “ABC test.”158 The ABC test creates a presumption that workers are employees rather than
independent contractors unless the hiring entity satisfies a three-part test. 159 An entity must
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establish that a worker (1) is free from its control, (2) performs work outside the usual course of
its business, and (3) is engaged in an independent trade or business. 160
The decision, however, has been superseded by a new statute.

Signed into law in

September 2019, California’s AB-5 161 purports to codify the California Supreme Court’s decision
in Dynamex. AB5 “creates a presumption that a worker who performs services for a hirer is an
employee for purposes of claims for wages and benefits arising under wage orders,” unless the
worker is shown to be an independent contractor under the ABC test.162 In response to AB5’s
enactment, Uber and Lyft are pursuing several strategies. First, Uber claims that it is still able to
pass the ABC test because the work of driving is outside the scope of Uber’s business which is
serving as a technology platform, not as a transportation company. 163 Second, Uber and Lyft refuse
to classify its drivers as employees.164 Third, Uber has changed its app to relinquish more control
to drivers.165 Finally, Uber and Lyft are promoting a 2020 ballot initiative to expressly exempt
themselves from AB5.166
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Unlike Dynamex/AB5, which established the standard for classifying workers, Chamber
of Commerce addressed the question of whether a local law, Ordinance 124968, 167 violated federal
antitrust law.168 Through the ordinance’s prescribed collective bargaining process, drivers and
rideshare companies could negotiate equipment standards, behaviors, background checks,
payments, hours, and other work conditions. 169 The plaintiff, the Chamber of Commerce, argued
that “the Ordinance violates, and is preempted by [the Sherman Antitrust Act] because the
Ordinance sanctions price-fixing of ride-referral service fees by private cartels of independentcontractor drivers.”170 The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss because it concluded
the City was immune from preemption.171 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded,
holding that the Ordinance did not meet the requirements for state-action immunity.172 To date,
neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit has addressed the underlying question of whether
the ordinance violates federal antitrust law. 173
III. Rideshare Drivers’ Collective Actions Are Not Protected Under Antitrust Law 174

167

Seattle,
Wash.,
Ordinance
124968
(Dec.
14,
2015),
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~legislativeItems/Ordinances/Ord_124968.pdf. See also SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 6.310.110;
§ 6.310.735.
168
Edward Gaus, “Gig Economy” Scores a Victory in Ninth Circuit Antitrust Case, A.B.A. (May 22, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/mass-torts/practice/2018/us-chamber-of-commerce-vcity-of-seattle/.
169
SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 6.310.735(H).
170
Chamber of Commerce, 890 F3d at 775.
171
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp 3d 1155, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
172
Chamber of Commerce, 890 F3d at 779–780.
173
Diva Limousine, Ltd. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 18-cv-05546-EMC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4274, at *27 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 9, 2019).
174
In Diva Limousine, Ltd. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 392 F Supp 3d 1074, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2019), plaintiffs argued that
Uber misclassifies its drivers as independent contractors, and that this misclassification violates antitrust law.
Recently, Diva dropped the lawsuit. Kathleen Dailey & Erin Mulvaney, Car Service Gets OK to Drop Antitrust Suit
Against Uber, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 24, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/car-service-getsok-to-drop-unfair-competition-suit-against-uber.

19

Antitrust law does not shield rideshare drivers from liability for artificial surge pricing
because drivers are independent contractors175 engaging in a practice in restraint of trade within
the meaning of the Sherman Act,176 Clayton Act,177 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Act.178 Federal antitrust laws prohibit “cartels, price fixing, and other combinations or practices
that undermine the free market.” 179 Collective activities by workers to improve their pay may
violate antitrust laws unless they fall within an exemption. 180 The Clayton Act181 and the NorrisLaGuardia Act182 provide labor exemptions from antitrust law. These laws, however, exclude
collective action by independent contractors under the labor exemptions. 183

The FTC Act

supplements and bolsters the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 184 Congress empowered the FTC
with “regulatory and quasi-judicial authority”185 “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations
. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 186
The principal federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act aims to promote market competition
by barring unreasonable restraints of trade or commerce. 187 The Sherman Act provides that
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“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 188
In the Sherman Act’s early years, courts held that union labor activities were unlawful restraints
of trade when a union's conduct or objectives were deemed “socially or economically harmful.” 189
Disagreeing with the courts’ enforcement of the Sherman Act against labor activities,
Congress enacted the Clayton Act. 190 The Clayton Act declares that “[t]he labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce.” 191 The law expressly provides that activities by labor
organizations “instituted for the purposes of mutual help” do not violate antitrust law. 192 Labor
organizations must be “bona fide,” which means combinations of employees, not independent
contractors.193
Enacted twenty years after the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act aimed to strengthen
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act by providing that courts may not enjoin labor activities that
are lawful under those statutes.194 In cases applying the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court
has held that antitrust law does not permit collective activities in restraint of trade by independent
entrepreneurs or independent contractors. 195 The Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents any federal court
from having
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
188
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(2013).
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persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly
or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work
or to remain in any relation of employment; (b) Becoming or remaining a member
of any labor organization or of any employer organization . . . (f) Assembling
peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor
dispute . . . .196
In Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, the Supreme Court posited that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act focused on labor disputes between employers and employees. 197 Because the respondents
were independent entrepreneurs, not employees, the federal courts had jurisdiction to issue an
injunction against their collective efforts to monopolize the regional fish industry. 198 In Los
Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, the Supreme Court similarly
concluded that the federal courts had jurisdiction to dissolve an “illegal combination between
businessmen and a union to restrain commerce.” 199 Although the independent entrepreneurs joined
what they described as a “union,” they were not immune from antitrust law because their case did
not arise from labor dispute.200
Because the antitrust labor exemption does not extend to independent contractors, the FTC
has brought enforcement actions against independent contractors for collectively organizing to
increase their wages.201 For example, in FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, the Supreme
Court held that independent lawyers’ collective activities constituted “a ‘naked restraint’ on price
and output.”202 The lawyers in that case agreed to boycott the District of Columbia government to
increase their public defense fees.203 Although the court did not discuss the antitrust labor
exemption, the lawyers’ collective activities would have been immune if the lawyers were
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employees rather than independent entrepreneurs. 204 As another example, in United States v.
Fed’n. of Physicians & Dentists, Inc., the U.S. Government alleged that independent physicians
impermissibly acted together to prevent a fee decrease. 205 The district court’s final judgment
expressly distinguished the physicians from unionized employees who may lawfully exercise their
right to organize as protected by the NLRA. 206
IV. Artificial Surge Pricing Likely Violates Antitrust Law as Price-Fixing
Collusion among competitors is “the supreme evil of antitrust.” 207 Under the Sherman Act,
an agreement between competitors to raise, depress, or fix the price of a commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.208 Such unlawful price-fixing is also prohibited under the
FTC Act.209 Because rideshare drivers are independent contractors whose actions fall outside the
scope of antitrust labor exemptions, they are likely engaging in unlawful price-fixing when they
work together to trigger surge pricing. 210 Since rideshare companies set surge prices, which drivers
then manipulate, both rideshare companies and drivers will probably be vulnerable to litigation,
including charges brought by the FTC.
A.

What Is Price-Fixing?
Generally, most collective activities “aimed at affecting prices” constitute price-fixing,

unless an exemption applies.211 Antitrust law recognizes two types of price-fixing: horizontal and
204
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vertical.212 Horizontal price-fixing agreements between independent competitors that dampen
output or competition to raise prices are per se unlawful.213 These agreements are per se unlawful
because they are likely to produce anticompetitive effects.214 To prove horizontal price-fixing, the
plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement or conspiracy, (2) among actual competitors, (3) “with the
purpose or effect of ‘raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity’
(4) in interstate or foreign commerce.”215 An explicit agreement or circumstantial evidence
establishing conspiratorial conduct may satisfy the first element. 216 But “conscious parallel
business behavior, standing alone, is insufficient to prove conspiracy.” 217
In contrast, because vertical price-fixing agreements between manufacturers and
distributors or retailers may have pro-competitive effects, they are subject to the “rule of
reason.”218 In Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court endorsed the rule
of reason as the standard for determining whether a vertical trade-restraining practice violates the
Sherman Act.219 The rule compares harmful, anticompetitive restraints with consumer-benefiting,
pro-competitive restraints.220 The “rule of reason” test is highly fact-specific.221 Courts must
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consider factors such as “specific information about the relevant business,” “the restraint's history,
nature, and effect,” and “[w]hether the businesses involved have market power.” 222
Vertical price-fixing inquiries focus on whether minimum-pricing agreements between
manufacturers and retailers or distributors may benefit consumers. 223 On one hand, vertical pricefixing may generate competition “among manufacturers selling different brands of the same type
of product.”224 Consumers benefit by gaining more options.225 On the other hand, vertical pricefixing could incentivize collusion to fix and set higher prices to generate greater profits for
retailers.226
B.

Rideshare Pricing as Illegal Price-Fixing
Although courts have not yet directly addressed the question of whether surge pricing,

artificial or not, constitutes illegal price fixing, legal challenges to the practice may succeed if
certain facts suggested in media reports on surge pricing are found to be true. 227 To prevail on a
claim of horizontal price-fixing, the FTC or other plaintiffs must prove, at minimum, that drivers
as competitors agreed among themselves to raise fares. 228 Presumably, that alone establishes
liability. In contrast, to prevail on a claim of vertical price-fixing, the FTC or other plaintiffs carry
the initial burden of showing that the agreement between rideshare companies and drivers has
anticompetitive effects on the market, such as reducing output and increasing price. 229 If the
plaintiffs succeed, however, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the agreement has
procompetitive effects.230 If the defendant meets this burden, then burden shifts back to the
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plaintiff to show that the procompetitive effects “could be reasonably achieved through less
anticompetitive means.”231
In terms of a horizontal price-fixing claim, the FTC or other plaintiffs are likely to succeed.
In Tampa, Florida, more than fifty drivers gathered to protest Uber’s reduced pay. 232 During the
rally, passengers were unable to request rides, which could have then triggered surge pricing. 233
Like the SCTLA lawyers who boycotted the District of Columbia to increase their pay, 234 the
drivers also refused to work to demand better wages. Similarly, at Reagan National Airport in
Washington, D.C., fifty drivers for Uber and Lyft parked in the waiting area and turned off their
apps, while two drivers monitored surge prices on the apps.235 Once the prices reached a certain
level, all drivers were told to turn their apps back on to take advantage of the surge pricing.
Additionally, drivers may also be using online forums to collectively plan surge-pricing. 236
Evidence of drivers organizing a rally, cooperating at airport waiting areas, or communicating via
the Internet to plan surge events may overcome the counterargument that the drivers merely
engaged in parallel behavior. Therefore, if drivers are found to have agreed to shut off their apps
at the same time to raise prices, then a court may conclude that the drivers engaged in horizontal
price-fixing.
In contrast to a horizontal price-fixing claim, a vertical price-fixing claim will likely be
more challenging. Uber, as the app creator, fixes prices that drivers agree to charge riders. 237
Because vertical price-fixing requires a rule of reason analysis, the court will balance the pricing

231

Id.
Johnston, supra note 135.
233
See id.
234
Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n., 493 U.S. at 428 (“Respondents' concerted action in refusing to accept further
CJA assignments until their fees were increased was thus a plain violation of the antitrust laws.”).
235
Zetlin, supra note 12.
236
Cara McGoogan, Uber Drivers Gang Up to Cause Surge Pricing, Research Says, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/02/uber-drivers-gang-cause-surge-pricing-research-says/.
237
First Am. Compl. at 1 ⁋ 2, Meyer v. Kalanick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82519.
232

26

system’s procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. The court will first inquire whether surge
pricing reduces output and whether it increases fare prices above the prices otherwise found in the
market.238 On one hand, surge pricing may be anticompetitive because it increases prices, and
Uber’s pricing system generally discourages drivers from competing with each other. 239 Surge
prices, however, may not be higher than consumers would expect to find in the market because
regular rideshare prices are artificially low. 240

On the other hand, surge pricing may be

procompetitive because it increases customer choices. When prices are high, other forms of
transportation, such as taxis,241 public transportation,242 or other ridesharing apps,243 might be more
attractive. Uber and Lyft’s prices might actually encourage new apps to enter the market, creating
more affordable consumer options.244
Meyer v. Kalanick may be the first case on point to explore the theory that surge pricing
constitutes price-fixing.245 In this case, Spencer Meyer, an Uber user on behalf of himself and
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others similarly situated, alleged that Travis Kalanick, Uber’s the CEO and co-founder, 246 violated
the Sherman Act.247 Meyer claimed that Kalanick himself “orchestrated and facilitated an illegal
price-fixing conspiracy” with Uber drivers. 248 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the district court ruled that Meyer’s complaint plausibly alleged that Kalanick and Uber engaged
in both horizontal and vertical price-fixing. 249 In terms of horizontal price-fixing, Meyer might
have a strong case. Meyer alleged that drivers worked together to decrease output by “stay[ing]
offline with UberX during non-surge times to trigger surges and thus obtain artificially increased
fares.”250 The court found that these alleged facts can plausibly show that drivers conspired to
decrease output and reduce competition to increase price. 251 As a threshold matter, however,
Meyer must prove conspiracy as an element of horizontal price-fixing. 252 Kalanick reasonably
pointed out that Meyer has not demonstrated any agreements among drivers. 253

Kalanick

contended that drivers independently agreed to use Uber’s pricing system, which does not
sufficiently show conspiracy.254 As to whether drivers agreed to act together to raise fares, Meyer
only stated that Uber organized “partner appreciation” events where drivers could meet. 255
Without more evidence, it is unclear whether Meyer can prove conspiracy by a large workforce
with high turnover rates.
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The district court denied the motion to dismiss because Meyer “adequately pled both a
horizontal and a vertical conspiracy.” 256 Subsequently, Kalanick and Uber moved to compel
arbitration, which the district court denied.257 The Second Circuit reversed and granted Kalanick’s
motion to compel arbitration.258 Thus, while courts have never fully considered whether Uber or
Uber’s drivers’ collective actions constituted price fixing, we may soon get a resolution. As of
October 2019, an arbitrator will hear arguments concerning whether Uber’s surge pricing violates
antitrust law in this case.259 Regardless of the outcome in this case, the FTC could still bring
charges. In the meantime, rideshare companies could also improve their ability to detect and stamp
out artificial surge pricing, which could prospectively reduce legal risk.
V.

How to Decrease or Prevent Artificial Surge Pricing to Avoid Antitrust Liability

To reduce litigation or regulatory risks associated with surge pricing, 260 rideshare
companies should voluntarily adopt policies aimed at preventing or disincentivizing artificial surge
pricing. Specifically, rideshare companies should increase driver compensation because drivers
engage in artificial surge pricing to generate more income. 261 Rideshare companies could increase
pay, provide benefits, give drivers the option of working as an employee, or any combination of
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these possibilities. This approach will also likely generate other benefits, such as reducing
turnover and ensuring quality service.262
Increasing driver compensation will directly address drivers’ dissatisfaction with their
earnings. Rideshare companies could offer a minimum wage, such as the $21 per hour rate that
Uber and Lyft have proposed;263 increase the percentage that drivers take from fares; 264 and
increase bonuses based on performance. 265 Uber and Lyft have also proposed offering drivers
stock, 266 which would not immediately provide cash.267
A significant benefit of increasing compensation is permitting rideshare companies to
continue partnering with drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. For drivers,
working as independent contractors is appealing precisely because of the flexibility. 268 “[D]rivers
change their work schedules from week to week, from day to day, and even from hour to hour.” 269
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Drivers can work around family and childcare obligations, rather than the reverse. 270 Drivers can
supplement their income through rideshare. 271

For rideshare companies, preserving the

independent contractor business model may help them avoid having to exert more control over the
workforce, such as requiring certain work hours. 272
While increasing compensation would address one major area of driver dissatisfaction, this
approach may still be unsatisfactory for drivers. For example, increasing pay would not address
the array of benefits that drivers want, 273 such as healthcare274 and reimbursements for vehicle and
maintenance expenses.275 Of course, rideshare companies could provide these benefits, which
Uber and Lyft have offered.276 Uber and Lyft have also proposed “forming a new driver
association, in partnership with state lawmakers and labor groups, to represent drivers’ interests
and administer the sorts of benefits that meet their highly individual needs.” 277 The costs of
increasing pay and providing benefits, however, could be passed on to riders 278 and further
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endanger the companies’ profitability.279 Still, the rideshare industry may be able to absorb these
costs.280
Going a step farther than increasing pay and offering benefits, rideshare companies could
also offer drivers a choice to work as an independent contractor or an employee. Instacart, an
online grocery shopping and delivery app, 281 illustrates how this could work.282 In 2015, Instacart
allowed its grocery shoppers to work as independent contractors or employees. 283 Additionally,
in 2019, Instacart began to offer a menu of benefits to all its workers, such as student loan
assistance and personal injury insurance. 284 Instacart’s independent contractors can work as much
as they want, while employees may work up to twenty-nine hours a week. 285 Instacart says that,
although its employees are more expensive than independent contractors, “this change improved
the quality and efficiency of order picking and made for a better customer experience.” 286 The
change also allowed Instacart to “perform management trainings and provide more quality
control.”287 Despite these internal policy changes, however, Instacart workers are still seeking
better pay.288
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By classifying its workers as employees, rideshare companies could avoid antitrust liability
resulting from artificial surge pricing.289 But rideshare companies are not receptive to this
approach. First, employing drivers would be very costly. 290 In California alone, employing drivers
would cost $508 million for Uber and $290 million for Lyft. 291 Second, rideshare companies
would have to exert more control over drivers. 292 This might involve less flexible scheduling for
drivers.293 Finally, rideshare companies may have to pare back their workforce to accommodate
the additional costs of employment.294
VI. Conclusion
While ordinary surge pricing erodes consumer trust in rideshare companies, artificial surge pricing
will likely heighten this effect, expose rideshare companies to litigation, and further discourage
people from becoming rideshare drivers. Even if the status quo is the most attractive choice for
now, it may not be the most sustainable long-term option. Rideshare companies can and should
get ahead of their labor problems by proactively meeting drivers’ economic needs. Earning (or reearning) drivers’ trust is essential to ensuring continued rideshare growth. 295 At minimum,
rideshare companies should increase drivers’ take-home pay. Ultimately, rideshare companies
will choose their path forward by weighing their tolerance for risk of antitrust liability against the
costs of paying drivers more, giving them benefits, or employing them.
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